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Abstract I argue that there are no physical singularities in space-time. Sin-
gular space-time models do not belong to the ontology of the world, because
of a simple reason: they are concepts, defective solutions of Einstein’s field
equations. I discuss the actual implication of the so-called singularity theo-
rems. In remarking the confusion and fog that emerge from the reification of
singularities I hope to contribute to a better understanding of the possibilities
and limits of the theory of General Relativity.
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Einstein always was of the opinion that singularities in classical field
theory are intolerable. They are intolerable from the point of view of
classical field theory because a singular region represents a breakdown
of the postulated laws of nature. I think one can turn this argument
around and say that a theory that involves singularities, and involves
them unavoidably, carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction...
Peter G. Bergmann
1 Introduction
The attitude of physicists towards singular solutions of classical field theories,
in particular theories of gravitation, has changed along time. In the case of
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General Relativity (GR) this change went from plain rejection1 to reification2.
After significant advances in the understanding of singular space-time models
during the 1990s, made by both physicists and philosophers (Clarke 1993,
Earman 1995), an attitude of caution, even skepticism, has emerged.
This paper is a plea for intolerance about singularities. I shall argue that
Einstein’s attitude towards singular solutions of GR was well-motivated and
essentially correct. My thesis can be simply stated: there are no singularities.
There are only singular space-time models, and they are defective representa-
tions of reality.
My blitz against singularities will follow a simple plan. I start in the next
section briefly discussing the relation between conceptual ways of representa-
tion and reality. Then, I formulate a simple ontological basis of GR. In the
subsequent sections I review the standard definitions of singular space-times,
and I discuss the ontological import of such models. If there are no singulari-
ties in GR, what are its main referents? A final section is devoted to this issue.
I close reviewing the highlights and prospects.
2 Language, representation, and reality
We all make a basic assumption when doing science: there is a reality to be
known. Without the postulate of the independent existence of a real world the
scientific enterprise would be vain. I shall not discuss this primary assumption
here. Rather, I want to focus on how we represent reality in our attempts to
understand it.
In order to build representations of the world we use conceptual systems
called languages. In ordinary life natural languages such as English, German
or Spanish are, or seem to be, enough. If we want to penetrate deeper into
the structure of reality, however, we need formal and less vague languages like
those provided by logic and mathematics.
Essentially, a formal language is a system of signs with a set of explicit rules
to generate valid combinations of symbols (see, for instance, the treatises by
Bunge 1974a,b and Martin 1978). These rules give instructions about how valid
arrangements of symbols (called formulas) are formed (syntactic rules), or they
relate symbols and formulas with extra-linguistic objects (semantic rules). The
operation of deduction allows to obtain valid formulas from valid formulas. If a
set of formulas is closed under deduction, we call it a theory. Any interpreted3
1 “For a singularity brings so much arbitrariness into the theory that it actually nullifies its
laws...Every field theory, in our opinion, must therefore adhere to the fundamental principle
that singularities of the field are to be excluded”, Einstein and Rosen (1935).
2 Reification is the mental process that elevates a concept to the status of an existent
entity. See, for instance, this statement of Hawking and Ellis (1973): “Recent observations
of the microwave background indicate that the universe contains enough matter to cause a
time-reversed closed trapped surface. This implies the existence of a singularity in the past,
at the beginning of the present epoch of expansion of the universe. This singularity is in
principle visible to us.”
3 ‘Interpreted’ in this context means ‘endowed with semantic rules’.
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theory, with the help of auxiliary conditions, should produce statements about
states of affairs that occur in the world. If a state of affairs can be used
to validate a statement and this statement satisfies truth conditions4 in the
theory, we say that the theory (actually one of its models) represents some
aspect of the world.
The use of formal languages in science brings many advantages, to the
point that those specific scientific disciplines that do not make intensive use of
formal methods are generally underdeveloped. Clarity and precision are gained
through formalization. This results in a significant reduction of the vagueness
that is inherent to natural languages. The extensive use of formalized lan-
guages, besides, enables us to elicit in a systematic way the consequences of
our assumptions. The adoption of the special class of formalized languages of
mathematics makes possible to introduce quantitative and complex represen-
tations of the properties and changes we detect in the world.
A basic assumption of factual science is that a property can be represented
by some mathematical function. Reality is not mathematical, but certainly
our more accurate representations of it are mathematical. Physical systems,
in general, are described by models where properties and processes are repre-
sented by mathematical constructs. Models, in this way, are representations of
the mechanisms we assume occur in physical systems. This is so to the extent
that to explain a thing is to unveil the mechanisms that operate in it, i.e. to
faithfully represent the manifold of physical processes with a coherent system
of mathematical functions and constructs (Bunge 2006)
Sometimes, in highly elaborated theories, however, formalization can reach
such a degree of complexity that the semantics of the language might be diffi-
cult to elucidate. This results in problems of interpretation and is a source of
confusion. Quantum mechanics and quantum field theories, for instance, are
highly formal theories whose interpretations are still matter of strong contro-
versy. There is no agreement even on what the referents of these theories are.
This is an unfortunate situation that should be settled by logic, semantical
analysis, and even experiment (see, e.g., Bunge 1967; Perez-Bergliaffa et al.
1993, 1996).
General Relativity is not free of this sort of problems. The complexity of
the field equations, which are non-linear, and the interpretation of the metric
tensor field have resulted in concerns on the ontological assumptions of the
theory. General Relativity is one of the several, and certainly the most impor-
tant, theories of the geometrization program of physics launched in the second
decade of the 20th century (for a review of the program see Vizgin 1994).
Although several first-rate theoreticians, such as Weyl, considered GR as a
theory of space-time, susceptible, in principle, to be expanded to encompass
also electromagnetic phenomena, Einstein initial attitude from 1915 and up
to 1919 was more cautious. In a letter to Sommerfeld written towards the end
of 1915, Einstein said (cited in Vizgin 1994):
4 See Tarski (1983) formal truth.
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[GR] essentially gives a law of the gravitational field, doing this,
moreover, completely uniquely if the requirement of general covariance
is satisfied.
Several others comments by Einstein from those years provide clear evidence
that he considered GR as a theory of the gravitational field, that should be
modified somehow to include quantum effects. He even noticed that (Einstein
1916):
An atom must, because of the intra-atomic motion of the electron,
emit not only electromagnetic but also gravitational energy, albeit in a
negligible amount. Since nothing like this occurs in reality, it is evident
that quantum theory must modify not only Maxwellian electrodynamics
but also the new theory of gravitation [GR].
Although at the end of the decade of 1910 Einstein thought of the metric
of space-time as a tensor field whose role in GR was to represent the gravita-
tional potential, as time went by he shifted towards a full geometrization of
physics. He started then to look for suitable generalizations of GR that could
accommodate electrodynamics. He also searched for particle-like solutions of
different field equations in order to accomplish the incorporation of the dis-
creteness required by the quantum aspects of reality (van Dongen 2010). His
intolerance to space-time singularities remained, nonetheless, unshakable.
3 What is space-time?
General relativity is said sometimes to be a ‘a theory of space and time’. We
read, for instance, in the classic textbook by Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler
(1973): “Space acts on matter, telling it how to move. In turn, matter reacts
back on space, telling it how to curve”’. The concept of space-time, however,
is presupposed by all classical field theories5. The concept was introduced by
Minkowski (1908), and belongs more to ontology than to physics (Romero
2012a). A formal construction of space-time can be obtained starting from
an ontological basis of either things (Perez-Bergliaffa et al. 1998) or events
(Romero 2012b). In what follows I provide a simple outline of the relation
between space-time and GR.
The basic ontological assumption is:
P0 - Ontological. Space-time is the ontological composition of all events.
Events can be considered as primitives or can be derived from things as
changes in their properties if things are taken as ontologically prior. Both rep-
resentations are equivalent since things can be construed as bundles of events
5 And most quantum theories. One exception is quantum loop gravity, which, up to some
extent, can be considered as an ontological theory. See, e.g., Rovelli (2004).
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(Romero 2012b). Since composition is not a formal operation but an ontolog-
ical one6, space-time is not a concept nor an abstraction, but an emergent
entity. As any entity, space-time can be represented by a concept. The usual
representation of space-time is given by a 4-dimensional manifold E equipped
with a metric field gab:
ST=ˆ 〈E, gab〉 .
I insist: space-time is not a manifold (i.e. a mathematical construct) but the
“totality” of all events. A specific model of space-time requires the specification
of the source of the metric field. This is done through another field, called the
“energy-momentum” tensor field Tab. Hence, a model of space-time can be
denoted by the following triplet:
MST = 〈E, gab, Tab〉 .
The relation between both tensor fields is given by Einstein’s field equa-
tions. The metric field represents the gravitational potential. The energy-
momentum field, the potential of change in space-time.
We can summarize all this in the following axioms.
P1− Syntactic. The setE is a C∞ differentiable, 4-dimensional, real pseudo-
Riemannian manifold.
P2− Syntactic. The metric structure of E is given by a tensor field of rank
2, gab, in such a way that the differential distance ds between two events is:
ds2 = gabdx
adxb.
P3− Syntactic. The tangent space of E at any point is Minkowskian, i.e.
its metric is given by a symmetric tensor ηab of rank 2 and trace −2.
P4− Syntactic. The metric of E is determined by a rank 2 tensor field Tab
through Einstein’s field equations:
Gab − gabΛ = κTab, (1)
where Gab is the Einstein’s tensor (a function of the second derivatives of the
metric) and Λ is a constant.
P5− Semantic. The elements of E represent physical events.
P6− Semantic. Space-time is represented by and an ordered pair 〈E, gab〉:
ST=ˆ 〈E, gab〉 .
6 For instance, a human body is composed by cells, but is not just a mere collection of
cells since it has emergent properties and specific functions far more complex than those of
the individual components.
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P7− Semantic. There is a non-geometrical field represented by a 2-rank
tensor field Tab on the manifold E.
P8− Semantic. A specific model of space-time is given by:
MST = 〈E, gab, Tab〉 .
Up to here we have a purely ontological theory. To transform this into a
physical theory (GR) we need three additional semantical postulates of phys-
ical nature.
P9− Semantic. The metric field gab represents the potential of the gravi-
tational field.
P10− Semantic. The energy-momentum tensor field Tab represents the
energy-momentum distribution of the physical systems other than the gravi-
tational field.
P11− Semantic. The constant κ gives the strength of the coupling between
the gravitational and non-gravitational fields. Its value is κ = 8piGc−4, where
G and c are the gravitational and vacuum speed of light constant, respectively.
Some comments are in order. First, with the interpretation given by the last
3 postulates, Eqs. (1) express a law of nature: the law of gravitational field. The
equations, just a formal constraint so far, become Einstein’s field equations.
Second, the energy-momentum tensor expresses the potential of a physical
system to change. The more a system can change, the more energy it has.
Energy, then, is not a thing, but a property: the most general of all properties,
shared by all things. It is the capability of changing (Bunge 1977). Changes are
events, so energy reflects the structure of space-time (the composition of all
events). Finally, singularities are features of some solutions of Eqs. (1). Hence,
they appear in our representations of ST and not in space-time itself.
4 Singular space-time models
A space-time model is said to be singular if the manifold E defined in the
previous section is incomplete. A manifold is incomplete if it contains at least
one inextendible curve. A curve γ : [0, a) −→ E is inextendible if there is no
point p in E such that γ(s) −→ p as a −→ s, i.e. γ has no endpoint in E.
A given space-time model 〈E, gab〉 has an extension if there is an isometric
embedding θ : M −→ E′, where 〈E′, g′
ab
〉 is another space-time model and
θ is an application onto a proper subset of E′. A singular space-time model
contains a curve γ that is inextendible in the sense given above. Singular
space-times are said to contain singularities, but this is an abuse of language:
singularities are not ‘things’ in space-time, but a pathological feature of some
solutions of the fundamental equations of the theory.
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Several singularity theorems can be proved from pure geometrical prop-
erties of the space-time model (Clarke 1993). The most important of these
theorems is due to Hawking and Penrose (1970):
Theorem. Let 〈E, gab〉 be a time-oriented space-time satisfying the fol-
lowing conditions:
1. RabV
aV b ≥ 0 for any non space-like V a7.
2. Time-like and null generic conditions are fulfilled.
3. There are no closed time-like curves.
4. At least one of the following conditions holds
– a. There exists a compact8 achronal set9 without edge.
– b. There exists a trapped surface.
– c. There is a p ∈ E such that the expansion of the future (or past)
directed null geodesics through p becomes negative along each of the
geodesics.
Then, 〈E, gab〉 contains at least one incomplete time-like or null geodesic.
If the theorem has to be applied to the physical world, the hypothesis must
be supported by empirical evidence. Condition 1 will be satisfied if the energy-
momentum T ab satisfies the so-called strong energy condition: TabV
aV b ≥
−(1/2)T aa , for any time-like vector V
a. If the energy-momentum is diagonal,
the strong energy condition can be written as ρ+3p ≥ 0 and ρ+p ≥ 0, with ρ
the energy density and p the pressure. Condition 2 requires that any time-like
or null geodesic experiences a tidal force at some point in its history. Condition
4a requires that, at least at one time, the universe is closed and the compact
slice that corresponds to such a time is not intersected more than once by a
future directed time-like curve. The trapped surfaces mentioned in 4b refer to
horizons due to gravitational collapse. Condition 4c requires that the universe
is collapsing in the past or the future.
The theorem is purely geometric, no physical law is invoked. Theorems of
this type are a consequence of the gravitational focusing of congruences. An
outline of the proof of the theorem is given in the Appendix.
7
Rab is the Ricci tensor obtained by contraction of the curvature tensor of the manifold
E.
8 A space is said to be compact if whenever one takes an infinite number of ”steps”
in the space, eventually one must get arbitrarily close to some other point of the space.
Thus, whereas disks and spheres are compact, infinite lines and planes are not, nor is a disk
or a sphere with a missing point. In the case of an infinite line or plane, one can set off
making equal steps in any direction without approaching any point, so that neither space
is compact. In the case of a disk or sphere with a missing point, one can move toward the
missing point without approaching any point within the space. More formally, a topological
space is compact if, whenever a collection of open sets covers the space, some sub-collection
consisting only of finitely many open sets also covers the space. A topological space is
called compact if each of its open covers has a finite sub-cover. Otherwise it is called non-
compact. Compactness, when defined in this manner, often allows one to take information
that is known locally – in a neighborhood of each point of the space – and to extend it to
information that holds globally throughout the space.
9 A set of points in a space-time with no two points of the set having time-like separation.
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5 Are there singularities?
Singularity theorems are not theorems that imply physical existence, under
some conditions, of space-time singularities. Material existence cannot be for-
mally implied. Existence theorems imply that under certain assumptions there
are functions that satisfy a given equation, or that some concepts can be
formed in accordance with some explicit syntactic rules. Theorems of this kind
state the possibilities and limits of some formal system or language. The con-
clusion of the theorems, although not obvious in many occasions, are always
a necessary consequence of the assumptions made.
In the case of singularity theorems of classical field theories like GR, what
is implied is that under some assumptions the solutions of the equations of
the theory are defective beyond repair. The correct interpretation of these
theorems is that they point out the incompleteness of the theory: there are
statements that cannot be made within the theory. In this sense (and only in
this sense), the theorems are like Go¨del’s famous theorems of mathematical
logic10.
To interpret the singularity theorems as theorems about the existence of
certain space-time models is wrong. Using elementary second order logic is
trivial to show that there cannot be non-predicable objects (singularities) in
the theory. If there were a non-predicable object in the theory,
(∃x)
E
(∀P ) ∼ Px, (2)
where the quantification over properties in unrestricted. The existential quan-
tification (∃x)
E
, on the other hand, means
(∃x)
E
≡ (∃x) ∧ (x ∈ E) .
Let us call P1 the property ‘x ∈ E’. Then, formula (2) reads:
(∃x) (∀P ) (∼ Px ∧ P1x), (3)
which is a contradiction, i.e. it is false for any value of x.
We conclude that there are no singularities nor singular space-times. There
is just a theory with a restricted range of applicability.
6 The ontology of General Relativity
The reification of singularities can lead to accept an incredible ontology. We
read, for instance, in a book on foundations of General Relativity citeKriele:
10 Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems are two theorems of mathematical logic that establish
inherent limitations of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems capable of doing arith-
metic. The first theorem states that any effectively generated theory capable of expressing
elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete (Go¨del 1931). The second
incompleteness theorem, shows that within such a system, it cannot be demonstrated its
own consistency.
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[...] a physically realistic spacetime must contain such singularities. [...]
there exist causal, inextendible geodesics which are incomplete. [...] If a
geodesic cannot be extended to a complete one (i.e. if its future endless
continuation or its past endless continuation is of finite length), then
either the particle suddenly ceases to exist or the particle suddenly
springs into existence. In either case this can only happen if spacetime
admits a “singularity” at the end (or the beginning) of the history of
the particle.
Kriele (1999), p. 383.
This statement and many similar ones found in the literature commit the
elementary fallacy of confusing a model with the object being modeled. Space-
time does not contain singularities. Some of our space-time models are singular.
It is this incomplete character of the theory that prompt us to go beyond Gen-
eral Relativity in order to get a more comprehensive view of the gravitational
phenomena. As it was very clear to Einstein, his general theory breaks down
when the gravitational field of quantum objects starts to affect space-time.
If General Relativity is not about singularities, what is it about? What
is the ontology assumed by the theory? The answer is given by any of the
several axiomatizations of GR that include explicit semantic axioms (Bunge
1967, Covarrubias 1993; see also the axioms presented above). The theory
of General Relativity is about classical gravitational fields and the motion of
material particles in them. No more, and no less, than what Einstein expressed
in his letter to Sommerfeld of 1915 quoted in the second section of this paper.
7 Conclusion: no place for singularities
I have argued in this paper that there are no physical space-time singularities.
There cannot be, neither. Singularities are not physical entities, but limits
of our ways of representing the world. There is no shame in that. General
Relativity is beautiful enough as to admit theorems that can determine the
conditions in which the theory cannot make consistent predictions. Excluding
singularities from our language we shall pave the way to face the real problems
posed to us: What is there inside black holes? What happened when the uni-
verse was under quantum effects? How General Relativity should be modified
to account for this strange world?
Appendix: an informal proof of the singularity theorem
A congruence is a family of curves such that exactly one, and only one, time-
like geodesic trajectory passes through each point p ∈ E. If the curves are
smooth, a congruence defines a smooth time-like vector field on the space-
time model. If V a is the time-like tangent vector to the congruence, we can
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write the spatial part of the metric tensor as:
hab = gab + VaVb. (4)
For a given congruence of time-like geodesic we can define the expansion,
shear, and torsion tensors as:
θab = V(i;l)h
i
ah
l
b, (5)
σab = θab −
1
3
habθ, (6)
ωab = h
i
ah
l
bV[i;l]. (7)
Here, the volume expansion θ is defined as:
θ = θabh
ab = ∇aV
a = V a;a. (8)
The rate of change of the volume expansion as the time-like geodesic curves
in the congruence are moved along is given by the Raychaudhuri equation
(Raychaudhuri 1955):
dθ
dτ
= −RabV
aV b −
1
3
θ2 − σabσ
ab + ωabω
ab,
or
dθ
dτ
= −RabV
aV b −
1
3
θ2 − 2σ2 + 2ω2. (9)
We can use now the Einstein field equations to relate the congruence with
the space-time curvature:
RabV
aV b = κ
[
TabV
aV b +
1
2
T
]
. (10)
The term TabV
aV b represents the energy density measured by a tie-like
observer with unit tangent four-velocity V a. The weak energy condition then
states that:
TabV
aV b ≥ 0. WEC (11)
A stronger condition is:
TabV
aV b +
1
2
T ≥ 0. SEC (12)
Notice that this condition implies, according to Eq. (10),
RabV
aV b ≥ 0. (13)
We see, then, that the conditions of the Hawking-Penrose theorem imply
that the focusing of the congruence yields:
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dθ
dτ
≤ −
θ2
3
, (14)
where we have used that both the shear and the rotation vanishes. Equation
(14) indicates that the volume expansion of the congruence must be necessarily
decreasing along the time-like geodesic. Integrating, we get:
1
θ
≥
1
θ0
+
τ
3
, (15)
where θ0 is the initial value of the expansion. Then, θ → −∞ in a finite proper
time τ ≤ 3/ |θ0|. This means that once a convergence occurs in a congruence of
time-like geodesics, a caustic must develop in the space-time model. The non
space-like geodesics are in such a case inextendible and the space-time model
singular.
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